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EXTENSION OF POSSESSION TO BOUNDUAES OR FENCES - REIMBURSE-
MENT OF BACK TAXES - Gary v. Dane, 411 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
- In an action for damages and for an injunction based on the fencing-out
of land, appellants, record title holders, sought to prevent appellee, an ad-
jacent home owner, from using a disputed strip of land between the two
houses. The district court granted judgment for the appellee, holding that
his title to the strip was established by adverse possession, but inserted a
condition requiring appellee to reimburse appellants for back taxes.
In affirming, the court of appeals reasoned that the record owner's pay-
ment of taxes attributable to a small border strip did not negate another's
adverse possession of that strip. However, the court held that reimburse-
ment for back taxes was required by the maxim that he who demands equity
must do it. This latter position does not reflect the general practice in ad-
verse possession cases.
ARMED SERVICES
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS - JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DISCHARGE REQUEST
- Brooks v. Clifford, 412 F.2d 1137 (4th Cir. 1969).- Appellant, a
conscientious objector on active duty in the Army, requested a discharge by
the Adjutant General. When his request was rejected he sought habeas
corpus relief in federal district court, thus failing to exhaust his adminis-
trative remedies which included petitioning the Army Board of Correction
of Military Records. Discounting traditional principles of administrative
exhaustion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that when a member of the armed forces on active duty is denied a request
for discharge as a conscientious objector, in spite of his failure to exhaust
available administrative remedies authorized by 10 U.S.C.A. § 1552 (1964),
the federal courts have jurisdiction to order the appellant's discharge.
This case is consonant with the current expansion of federal court juris-
diction into military matters as evidenced by Oestereich v. Selective Serv.
Sys. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967). However, by so
holding, the Fourth Circuit is presently in direct conflict with Claycroft
v. Ferrall, 408 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1969), and, therefore, Supreme Court re-
view of the issue is probable.
COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION - LIMITATIONS - O'Callahan v. Parker,
395 U.S. 258 (1969).- Petitioner, a sergeant in the Army, while on leave
from his base and dressed in civilian clothes, allegedly broke into the hotel
room of a young girl and attempted to rape her. Subsequently, petitioner
was convicted by a court-martial and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment;
he was denied relief in the lower federal courts on his application for a writ
of habeas corpus. In reversing, the Supreme Court held that for court-mar-
tial jurisdiction to attach, not only must the accused be a present member of
the Armed Forces, but also the alleged offense must be service-connected.
The decision introduces the concept of a service-connected crime, but
the Court chose not to define its exact limits. By so holding, the Court has
underscored its determination to limit the scope of military jurisdiction, a
trend which began with Reed v. Covert, 395 U.S. 1 (1957).
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ASSAULT
NATURE AND ELEMENTS - INTENT - McDonald v. Ford, 38 U.S.L.W.
2037 (Fla. Ct. App. July 4, 1969).- A passionate swain inflicted injuries
upon his beloved during a vigorous attempt to kiss her. Alleging negli-
gence, the damsel sued her lover for damages. The court dismissed the
complaint, holding that assault and battery involves intentional, not negli-
gent acts. The opinion emphasized that there is nothing inadvertent about
the physical contact involved in an amorous wrestling match.
Recognizing a dearth of Florida law regarding nonconsenting females,
the court followed the firmly entrenched Ohio precedent, Williams v. Press-
man, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 161, 113 N.E.2d 395 (P. Ct. 1953), in deciding that
the issue of intent rather than due care was more germane to the facts.
BANKRUPTCY
DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE - PREFERENCES AND TRANSFER - Dubay
v. Williams, ____ F.2d ---- (9th Cir. 1969).- There has been much con-
fusion concerning the relationship between the federal law of bankruptcy
and security interests created pursuant to sections 9-108, 9-204, and 9-205
of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC). In the instant case, a credi-
tor claimed such a security interest in the accounts receivable of the bank-
rupt Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., Inc. Noting that the creditor
was first assigned the accounts in a security agreement executed eleven
months prior to the adjudication in bankruptcy, the circuit court allowed
the creditor's claim, holding that the transfer of the accounts took place at
the moment of the initial assignment, and, therefore, the security interest
was not voidable under the provisions of section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy
Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1) (1964), which precludes all preferential trans-
fers made within four months of an adjudication in bankruptcy. In deter-
mining the timing of the transfer of the accounts, the court looked to the
Bankruptcy Act which provides that the secured creditor's rights are per-
fected when no subsequent creditor can acquire a superior right, a moment
defined by the Oregon statute (UCC) to be when the financial statement
is filed.
The court's statutory dovetailing continues the trend of validating UCC
security interests in future accounts, so-called "floating liens," in the face of
preference attacks under the Bankruptcy Act. By so holding, the DuBay
court indicates, contrary to the opinion of many legal writers, there is no
real conflict between the two laws.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
PRELIMINARY AND INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS - TRADE SECRETS
- E.W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1969).
- Appellees, manufacturers of solid-state electronic equipment, sought in-
junctive relief against several of their former employees and their new em-
ployer, appellant, to restrain the unauthorized use of appellees' trade secrets.
The district court issued a preliminary injunction, but on appeal the injunc-
tion was set aside and the case remanded on the ground that the order
violated FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d), in that it did not mention the proscribed
conduct with specificity. By setting aside the order, the court of appeals is
requiring that to protect trade secrets, preliminary injunctions must disclose
the trade secrets so that the persons being enjoined may carry on their activ-
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ities without violating the injunction. Previous cases have dearly held that
an injunction may issue to protect trade secrets, but by strictly interpreting
FED. R. CIv. P. 65(d), the Eighth Circuit has negated the protection af-
forded through injunctive relief.
CIVIL RIGHTS
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS - EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW - Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 409 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1968).- When plaintiff and
her Negro students went to defendant's lunch counter, defendant's waitress
claimed that although she had a duty to serve Negroes, she need not
serve the whites that accompany them. Plaintiff brought an action claiming
that because the statute upon which defendant was attempting to justify his
waitress' action, Miss. CODE ANN. § 2046.5 (1942), a criminal trespass
statute allowing business concerns to serve whomever they wish, violated
the 14th amendment, he was entitled to damages under the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). A federal district court directed
a verdict for the defendant, and, in a split decision the court of appeals af-
firmed, holding that plaintiff had proved neither the existence of a statute-
based custom of refusing service in restaurants to whites accompanied by
Negroes nor that such a custom was enforced by Mississippi courts.
The court's implication that the trespass statute does not constitute state
action violative of the 14th amendment is in conflict with the rule estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244
(1963), wherein the Court invalidated state legislation which either en-
courages or authorizes citizens to infringe upon the civil rights of others.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DUE PROCESS OF LAW - DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY - State v. Scheetz,
---- Iowa . 166 N.W.2d 874 (1969).- The defendant was confined
pursuant to the Iowa Criminal Sexual Psychopath Law, IowA CODE ANN.§ 225A (1969), and subsequently appealed, contending that the incarcera-
tion violated his right to due process of law. A detective who had ques-
tioned defendant at the Cedar Rapids police station about a sex crime had
not informed him of his right to court-appointed counsel. Although de-
fendant was never charged with that particular sex crime, the detective did
testify against him in the sexual psychopath hearing. In upholding the stat-
ute, the Supreme Court of Iowa called attention to the statute's provisions
which afforded the defendant the right to both counsel and a jury trial, and
reasoned that these provisions protected defendant's right to due process of
law. The court distinguished Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
holding that because the instant action was a rehabilitative civil proceeding,
Mirandds protections were not applicable. The court rejected the conten-
tion that the spirit of Miranda should be applied to a noncriminal proceed-
ing as was done in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), wherein the Supreme
Court held that whether criminal or civil, a deprivation of liberty could be
effected only in accordance with due process of law.
In refusing to apply the Gault protections by analogy the Supreme Court
of Iowa has made an unjustifiable distinction which, as a strong dissent
points out, fails to comport with the spirit of the Supreme Court's delinea-
tion of the scope of due process.
DUE PRocEss OF LAw - OHIO IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE - In re Wil-
liamson, 18 Ohio Misc. 67, 246 N.E.2d 618 (C.P. 1969).- Appellant was
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arrested and charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol.
After having refused to take a chemical test to determine the percentage of
alcohol in his body, appellant was prosecuted in the county court and en-
tered a plea of guilty. In accordance with the usual sentence imposed for
the first offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI), appellant received a
30-day suspension of his driving privileges. After surrender of his li-
cense, appellant received notification from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles
that by reason of Ohio's Implied Consent Statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4511.191 (Page Supp. 1967), and his refusal to submit to a chemical test,
his operator's license was to be suspended for a period of 6 months. Upon
this notification, plaintiff appealed to the Paulding County Court of Com-
mon Pleas which held that the action of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles was
a denial of appellant's constitutional right to a remedy by due course of law
as provided by OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16.
In the past, irrespective of the outcome of a proceeding before a court,
refusal to submit to a chemical test has automatically resulted in a 6-month
loss of driving privileges as prescribed by the Implied Consent Statute.
However, by allowing a DWI violator to choose between administrative and
judicial sanctions, the court has engrafted upon the Ohio statute an unwar-
ranted proviso which may encourage certain magistrates to perpetuate their
lenient sentencing of such offenders.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS - CONTROL OVER GOVERNMENTAL AGEN-
CIES - In re llVickstrum, 454 P.2d 660 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1969).- Peti-
tioners challenged an order of the county superintendent annexing Unity
School District to two adjacent districts; one was an independent district ac-
credited by the State Board of Education, the other was an unaccredited,
dependent district. Petitioners, parents of Unity school children, contended
that the parents and children transferred to the dependent district were de-
nied equal protection of the law. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held
that the annexation procedure, initiated by petition and approved at a spe-
cial election, conformed to applicable State statutes. Affirming the an-
nexation order, the court acknowledged that students at the independent
school might receive a better education, but it could find no authority to
suggest that the parents and children sent to the dependent school would
be denied equal protection of the law.
Apparently the Oklahoma court tacitly recognized that the prime tar-
get of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and subsequent fed-
eral school decisions has been inequality of education among races. In the
absence of racial inequities, the courts have not required that all citizens re-
ceive equal educational opportunities.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH - REGULATIONS AND RESTRAINTS - Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).- When Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. refused to grant free reply time to an author who felt he had
been personally attacked in a broadcast, the FCC declared that the company
had failed to meet its obligation under the fairness doctrine to provide reply
time, whether or not paid for. Red Lion challenged the constitutional and
statutory bases of the doctrine and its attendant regulations, claiming the
first amendment gave it the right to broadcast what it chose and to exclude
anyone from using the frequency. Reversing an earlier Seventh Circuit
position taken on a similar case and affirming the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Red Lion, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine
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and regulations were valid and constitutional, that they enhanced rather than
abridged freedoms of speech and the press.
Red Lion reflects a reaffirmation by the Court that because private
rights of licensees to limited public resources such as radio frequencies cannot
take priority over the public good that is derived from adequate and fair
coverage of matters of public interest, they are subject to at least some regu-
lation.
STATE POLICE POWER - MOTORCYCLIST'S HEADGEAR - State v. Fetterly,
---- Ore. 456 P.2d 996 (1969).- Appellant was convicted for op-
erating a motorcycle on a state highway without wearing protective head-
gear as required by ORE. REV. STAT. § 483.443(1) (1967). Appellant
alleged that the statute was an improper exercise of the state's police power,
and, as such, was a restraint upon his personal liberty in contravention of
due process clauses of both the Oregon and Federal Constitutions. The su-
preme court, citing Liggett Co. v. Bladridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928), held
that by prohibiting the use of state highways to a motorcyclist who is not
wearing protective headgear, the statute bore a real and substantial relation-
ship to public safety, and, therefore, was a valid exercise of the state's police
power.
Recently, legislatures have recognized the importance of enacting new
safety statutes to meet the vast increase in the number of motorcycles on
our nation's highways. The Oregon decision reaffirms the position taken
by the majority of the courts which have had occasion to pass upon similar
statutes.
SEARCH AMD SEIZURE - FINGERPRINTING - Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721 (1969).- Petitioner was convicted of rape based on fingerprint
evidence obtained when police detained petitioner without probable cause
and without a warrant for his arrest. The Supreme Court of Mississippi af-
firmed the conviction, holding that the trustworthiness of such evidence
renders inapplicable the proscriptions of the fourth and 14th amendments.
In reversing, the Supreme Court of the United States further delineated
the holding of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), wherein the Court ap-
plied the federal exclusionary rule to the states. In addition to this defini-
tional expansion, the decision reaffirms the extension of fourth amendment
strictures into the prearrest stage of criminal investigation, including any in-
voluntary detention. Interestingly, the Court intimated that the fourth
amendment requirements could be met by narrowly circumscribed proce-
dures, allowing the fingerprinting of individuals without probable cause
during the course of a criminal investigation. Perhaps the Court imposed
this modicum of self-restraint in deference to those who have characterized
its recent decisions as shackles upon our law enforcement agencies.
CRIMINAL LAW
INCOME TAX EVASION - PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS - United States v.
Tarlowski, 38 U.S.L.W. 2133 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 1969).- In a criminal
tax evasion investigation, the taxpayer's accountant was asked to leave the
room on two occasions while a revenue agent conducted an interview and
examined the financial books of the prospective defendant. Although the
taxpayer was advised of his right to counsel on both occasions, the federal
district court held that the evidence gathered at the interviews must be sup-
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pressed because by refusing the taxpayer the right to the presence of his ac-
countant, the agent denied the taxpayer a liberty without due process of law
in violation of the fifth amendment. After noting that a taxpayer need not
be warned of his right to counsel in noncustodial tax evasion investigations
under the rule of United States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1968), the
court indicated that this did not mean that a taxpayer could not of his own
accord retain counsel or its equivalent in a criminal tax evasion investigation.
The court adopted the rationale of Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
503 (1963), that if there is no reasonable basis for claiming that an unfair
method of investigation is in any way essential to the detection of a crime,
the method should be vitiated. The court recognized that the defendant's
request was well founded because of the advice and protection afforded by
one's accountant in tax evasion cases.
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND FINAL COMMITMENT - CONDITIONS - In
re Allen, ____ Cal. App. 2d . 455 P.2d 143, 78 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1969).
- After petitioner's conviction for possessing dangerous drugs without a
prescription, her sentence was suspended and she was placed on probation.
By application for habeas corpus, the petitioner challenged that condition
of her probation order which directed her to repay the county for court-
appointed counsel. The Supreme Court of California held that a condition
ordering the accused to reimburse the county for court-appointed counsel
was improper. The court reasoned that it was inconsistent to provide an
accused indigent with free court-appointed counsel, and then to condition
her probation upon payment of counsel fees. The court projected, in dic-
tum, that had the defendant been previously advised that her probation
might be conditioned on payment of counsel fees, this notification could
have deterred her from accepting court-appointed counsel.
In so holding, the California court has extended the rule of Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), that a condition which makes costly an
individual's free exercise of a constitutional right is invalid.
PUNISHMENT AND PREVENTION OF CRIME - CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUN-
ISHMENT - Vick v. State, 453 P.2d 342 (Alas. 1969).- Vick, a chronic
alcoholic, was convicted by the district court of appearing in public in a
drunken condition and was given a 90-day jail sentence. The superior
court upheld the conviction and Vick appealed, claiming that the conviction
of a chronic alcoholic for being drunk in public violated the prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment contained in U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, and
ALAS. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
Holding that the imprisonment of Vick was not cruel and unusual
punishment, the Supreme Court of Alaska followed the ancient common
law rule which was perpetuated in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
The court noted that even a chronic alcoholic may have the requisite mens
rea because loss of self-control once an individual has started to drink, dif-
fers from the loss of control which makes it impossible for him to abstain
from drinking in the first place. To rule otherwise would be to abandon
the traditional concept of free will and lead to a virtual abandonment of
criminal law. By its decision, the court chose to ignore the mounting patho-
logical data on chronic compulsive alcoholism, thereby preserving a medi-
eval tenet of criminal justice.
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INSURANCE
CONTRACTS - DISCLAIMER AND ARBITRATION CLAUSES - Heisner v. Jones,
---- Neb. , 169 N.W.2d 606 (1969).- Plaintiff's insurance contract
both provided for compulsory arbitration of the insured's claims under the
contract's uninsured motorist provision and disclaimed any liability of the
insurer for judgments rendered in suits brought without its written consent.
In affirming the rule of German-American Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb.
505, 41 N.W. 406 (1889), the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that these
two provisions were void as against public policy. The court characterized
the contract as one of adhesion, noting that the inferior bargaining position
of the motorist who purchases liability insurance forces him to accept a
policy as offered and that the motorist is often unaware of the small print
by which he relinquishes his right to the procedural safeguards of a court
of law.
The decision follows the majority of jurisdictions which invalidate pro-
visions for compulsory arbitration of the liability issue, but it departs from
that facet of the majority rule which validates arbitration for fixing the
amount of loss. The minority position followed by Ohio permits compul-
sory arbitration of both liability and amount, OHIo REV. CODE § 2711.01
(Page 1954).
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY - INJURIES FROM DEFECTS OR OBSTRUCTIONS IN
HIGHWAYS - Fankhauser v. Mansfield, 19 Ohio St. 2d 102, 249 N.E.2d
789 (1969).- In an action against a municipal corporation for personal in-
juries and death, appellants, injured in an automobile accident, alleged that
the municipality had failed to repair a traffic signal after receiving reason-
able notice that the signal was not functioning properly, thereby maintain-
ing a nuisance in violation of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 723.01 (Page
1954). The trial court sustained a demurrer to the petition and dismissed
the case, and the judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals.
In reversing, the Supreme Court of Ohio overruled its own prior deci-
sions and held that a nonfunctioning overhead electric traffic signal on a
municipal street affects the physical condition existing in or on highways,
and is a nuisance. The decision is a new thrust in the street safety exception
to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and may well trigger litigation on
this point in other states,
PATENTS
MISUSE OF PATENTS - CONTROL OF UNPATENTED GOODS - Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).- In a pat-
ent infringement action the defendant, Zenith, counterclaimed under sec-
tion 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964), to enjoin the plaintiff
from requiring that royalties on the manufacture, sale, or use of any article
not covered by the patent be included in the patent license agreements with
Zenith. The court of appeals reversed the district court's granting of the
injunction on the ground that such a license agreement had been given the
Supreme Court's sanction in Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Re-
search, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950), wherein the Court upheld a percent-of-
sales license which provided for royalties based on the total volume of a
product even though not all the manufactured units were to include the
patented device. Zenith appealed.
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In reinstating the district court's judgment, the Court distinguished the
holding in Automatic Radio on the ground that by using its patent as a
lever to force Zenith to accept a percent-of-sales license, Hazeltine had un-
lawfully abused its patent privilege during the license negotiations. Al-
though the Court may have satisfactorily resolved the present case, their
rather tenuous distinctions will be of little help to attorneys trying to draft
acceptable patent license agreements.
TAXATION
DEDUCTIONS - BUSINESS EXPENSES - Tyne v. Commissioner, 409 F.2d
485 (7th Cir. 1969).- Petitioner had claimed as an ordinary business de-
duction under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162, 100 percent of his auto-
mobile expenses in transporting two hundred pounds of tools to and from
work each day. He asserted that he would not have used his automobile
"but for" the necessity of transporting his tools. The court of appeals re-
versed the Tax Court which had upheld the Commissioner's determination
that 50 percent of the driving expenses were allocable to the transporting of
tools, and remanded the case to give petitioner an opportunity to establish
at trial the necessity for driving to work. If successful, petitioner would be
entitled to deduct 100 percent of his automobile expenses.
By permitting a taxpayer a 100 percent deduction if he can establish the
"but for" issue, the court has created another exception to the general rule
that commuting expenses are nondeductable personal expenses.
JOINT RETURN - LIABILITY FOR TAXES ON ILLEGALLY OBTAINED FUNDS
- Scudder v. United States, 405 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1968), rehearing de-
nied, 410 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1969).- Petitioner's husband illegally with-
drew large sums of money from the family partnership and invested it with-
out his wife's knowledge. Because of the dual responsibility incurred in a
joint return, when the husband could not be located, the Commissioner as-
sessed the petitioner for income taxes and penalties due. The Tax Court
determined that the illegally obtained money was taxable income and im-
posed liability on the petitioner by virtue of the joint return. On review,
the court of appeals remanded the case, relieving her of liability for taxes
on the funds themselves, but not for taxes realized from profits therefrom.
The court distinguished this case from James v. United States, 366 U.S.
213 (1961), wherein embezzled funds were designated taxable income,
by characterizing this money as an "unauthorized loan" and therefore not
taxable. This euphemistic equivocation allowed the court to avoid the James
rationale and decide the case on a more equitable ground.
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS - DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS -
O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969).- After operating
as a partnership for about 55 years, Drs. Hill & Thomas was reorganized in
1963 as Drs. Hill & Thomas Company under the Ohio Professional Asso-
ciation Law, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1785.01-.08 (Page 1964). Dr.
O'Neill, a shareholder, reported and paid taxes on the amount of income
which would have been taxable to him had the Company remained a partner-
ship. After having been denied a refund, petitioner brought an action to re-
cover the tax paid on the difference between the amount reported as partner-
ship income and his corporate salary for the taxable year.
In affirming the opinion below, the court of appeals allowed the refund
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and held that a professional business organization incorporated under the
Ohio Professional Association Law was a corporation for federal income
tax purposes. Holding Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1(c) and 301.7701-2 in-
valid, the court impliedly permits a professional corporation to create a de-
ferred compensation plan with its resultant tax advantages. See 20 CAsE
W. REs. L. REv. 260 (1968).
UsE TA X s - INCIDENCE - Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, ___
S.C _. , 168 S.E.2d 774 (1969). Colonial Stores, a grocery chain which
self-redeemed trading stamps, brought an action to recover a use tax paid on
premium merchandise at redemption. The trial court granted recovery and
held that any taxes due had been paid on the original transaction in which
the customer received the stamps. On appeal, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina reversed, holding that the use tax was properly levied because the
merchandise was transferred in a separate transaction not constituting a part
of the original sale.
The court analogized to the rationale of the Supreme Court of Arizona
in Tax Comm'n v. Ryan-Evans Drug Stores, 89 Ariz. 18, 357 P.2d 607
(1960), wherein that court labeled a redemption plan as a promotional
scheme and refused to allow the taxpayer to deduct the cost of its stamp
program under the cash discount provisions of the Arizona sales tax. The
decision runs counter to the position taken by the few courts that have con-
sidered the point.
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